This library verifies Solid OIDC access tokens via their webid claim, and thus asserts ownership of a WebID.

It conforms to the Solid OIDC specification.

See also: Solid OIDC Primer Request Flow

• DPoP Bound Access Tokens
• Bearer Access Tokens
• Caching of:
  • WebID Identity Providers
  • Identity Providers JSON Web Key Sets
  • A minimalistic version of DPoP tokens identifiers to mitigate replays otherwise mostly mitigated by the 60 seconds maximum DPoP Token age, should be improved to take a configurable max requests per seconds to avoid overflow of cache before replay. But de facto, if someone really wanted to mitigate this attack, they should plug a cache that can support high numbers of requests. Someone could easily overflow a lru cache by logging lots of requests as themselves before replaying the token. That is if the server can answer fast enough...
• Custom Identity Verification Classes to extend to specific caching strategies if needed

Verify Solid Access Tokens with a simple function:

import type { RequestMethod, SolidTokenVerifierFunction } from '@solid/access-token-verifier';
import { createSolidTokenVerifier } from '@solid/access-token-verifier';

const solidOidcAccessTokenVerifier: SolidTokenVerifierFunction = createSolidTokenVerifier();

try {
  const { client_id: clientId, webid: webId } = await solidOidcAccessTokenVerifier(
    authorizationHeader as string,
    {
      header: dpopHeader as string,
      method: requestMethod as RequestMethod,
      url: requestURL as string
    }
  );

  console.log(`Verified Access Token via WebID: ${webId} and for client: ${clientId}`);

  return { webId, clientId };
} catch (error: unknown) {
  const message = `Error verifying Access Token via WebID: ${(error as Error).message}`;

  console.log(message);

  throw new Error(message);
}

The solidOidcAccessTokenVerifier function takes an authorization header which can be an encoded Bearer or DPoP bound access token and optional DPoP parameters.

• Further sanitation of inputs? For example a maximum authorization header size. Needs further discussions before resolution.
• Improve default caching? Assess other libraries that might be used.
• Evolve the type guards and the type guard library.
• Allow http over tls on all WebIDs instead of enforcing https as per: https://github.com/solid/authentication-panel/issues/114.
• Enforce client ID when support is wide enough as per: https://solid.github.io/solid-oidc/#tokens-access
• Enforce azp claim in the next library which should target ID tokens as opposed to Access tokens as per the updated Solid-OIDC spec
• Enforce DPoP ath claim when support is wide enough as per: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04#section-4.2