Since Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially leaking Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers, specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of how rebuild_proxies is used to recompute and reattach the Proxy-Authorization header to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has only been observed to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user information component (e.g. https://username:password@proxy:8080).
Current vulnerable behavior(s):
HTTP → HTTPS: leak
HTTPS → HTTP: no leak
HTTPS → HTTPS: leak
HTTP → HTTP: no leak
For HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the Proxy-Authorization header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in Requests forwarding the header to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate those credentials.
The reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the Proxy-Authorization header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage of the ProxyManager in adapters.py with proxy_manager_for. This will compute the required proxy headers in proxy_headers and pass them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for default usage.
Patches
Starting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials are already properly being handled by urllib3's ProxyManager.
For users with custom adapters, this may be potentially breaking if you were already working around this behavior. The previous functionality of rebuild_proxies doesn't make sense in any case, so we would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter.
Workarounds
For users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one potential workaround.
You may disable redirects by setting allow_redirects to False on all calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you're currently relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination.
import requests
r = requests.get('http://github.com/', allow_redirects=False)
Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following individuals.
Dennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/)
Tobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@gmail.com)
When using a requests.Session, if the first request to a given origin is made with verify=False, TLS certificate verification may remain disabled for all subsequent requests to that origin, even if verify=True is explicitly specified later.
This occurs because the underlying connection is reused from the session's connection pool, causing the initial TLS verification setting to persist for the lifetime of the pooled connection. As a result, applications may unintentionally send requests without certificate verification, leading to potential man-in-the-middle attacks and compromised confidentiality or integrity.
This behavior affects versions of requests prior to 2.32.0.
The requests.utils.extract_zipped_paths() utility function uses a predictable filename when extracting files from zip archives into the system temporary directory. If the target file already exists, it is reused without validation. A local attacker with write access to the temp directory could pre-create a malicious file that would be loaded in place of the legitimate one.
Affected usages
Standard usage of the Requests library is not affected by this vulnerability. Only applications that call extract_zipped_paths() directly are impacted.
Remediation
Upgrade to at least Requests 2.33.0, where the library now extracts files to a non-deterministic location.
If developers are unable to upgrade, they can set TMPDIR in their environment to a directory with restricted write access.
📣 Requests is adding inline types. If you have a typed code base that
uses Requests, please take a look at #7271. Give it a try, and report
any gaps or feedback you may have in the issue. 📣
Security
CVE-2026-25645 requests.utils.extract_zipped_paths now extracts
contents to a non-deterministic location to prevent malicious file
replacement. This does not affect default usage of Requests, only
applications calling the utility function directly.
Improvements
Migrated to a PEP 517 build system using setuptools. (#7012)
Bugfixes
Fixed an issue where an empty netrc entry could cause
malformed authentication to be applied to Requests on
Python 3.11+. (#7205)
Deprecations
Dropped support for Python 3.9 following its end of support. (#7196)
The SSLContext caching feature originally introduced in 2.32.0 has created
a new class of issues in Requests that have had negative impact across a number
of use cases. The Requests team has decided to revert this feature as long term
maintenance of it is proving to be unsustainable in its current iteration.
Deprecations
Added support for Python 3.14.
Dropped support for Python 3.8 following its end of support.
CVE-2024-47081 Fixed an issue where a maliciously crafted URL and trusted
environment will retrieve credentials for the wrong hostname/machine from a
netrc file.
Improvements
Numerous documentation improvements
Deprecations
Added support for pypy 3.11 for Linux and macOS.
Dropped support for pypy 3.9 following its end of support.
To provide a more stable migration for custom HTTPAdapters impacted
by the CVE changes in 2.32.0, we've renamed _get_connection to
a new public API, get_connection_with_tls_context. Existing custom
HTTPAdapters will need to migrate their code to use this new API.
get_connection is considered deprecated in all versions of Requests>=2.32.0.
A minimal (2-line) example has been provided in the linked PR to ease
migration, but we strongly urge users to evaluate if their custom adapter
is subject to the same issue described in CVE-2024-35195. (#6710)
Fixed an issue where setting verify=False on the first request from a
Session will cause subsequent requests to the same origin to also ignore
cert verification, regardless of the value of verify.
(GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56)
Improvements
verify=True now reuses a global SSLContext which should improve
request time variance between first and subsequent requests. It should
also minimize certificate load time on Windows systems when using a Python
version built with OpenSSL 3.x. (#6667)
Requests now supports optional use of character detection
(chardet or charset_normalizer) when repackaged or vendored.
This enables pip and other projects to minimize their vendoring
surface area. The Response.text() and apparent_encoding APIs
will default to utf-8 if neither library is present. (#6702)
Bugfixes
Fixed bug in length detection where emoji length was incorrectly
calculated in the request content-length. (#6589)
Fixed deserialization bug in JSONDecodeError. (#6629)
Fixed bug where an extra leading / (path separator) could lead
urllib3 to unnecessarily reparse the request URI. (#6644)
Deprecations
Requests has officially added support for CPython 3.12 (#6503)
Requests has officially added support for PyPy 3.9 and 3.10 (#6641)
Requests has officially dropped support for CPython 3.7 (#6642)
Requests has officially dropped support for PyPy 3.7 and 3.8 (#6641)
Documentation
Various typo fixes and doc improvements.
Packaging
Requests has started adopting some modern packaging practices.
The source files for the projects (formerly requests) is now located
in src/requests in the Requests sdist. (#6506)
Starting in Requests 2.33.0, Requests will migrate to a PEP 517 build system
using hatchling. This should not impact the average user, but extremely old
versions of packaging utilities may have issues with the new packaging format.
Configuration
📅 Schedule: (UTC)
Branch creation
At any time (no schedule defined)
Automerge
At any time (no schedule defined)
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box
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This PR contains the following updates:
Unintended leak of Proxy-Authorization header in requests
CVE-2023-32681 / GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q
More informationDetails
Impact
Since Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially leaking Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers, specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of how rebuild_proxies is used to recompute and reattach the Proxy-Authorization header to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has only been observed to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user information component (e.g. https://username:password@proxy:8080).
Current vulnerable behavior(s):
For HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the Proxy-Authorization header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in Requests forwarding the header to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate those credentials.
The reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the Proxy-Authorization header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage of the ProxyManager in adapters.py with proxy_manager_for. This will compute the required proxy headers in proxy_headers and pass them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for default usage.
Patches
Starting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials are already properly being handled by urllib3's ProxyManager.
For users with custom adapters, this may be potentially breaking if you were already working around this behavior. The previous functionality of rebuild_proxies doesn't make sense in any case, so we would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter.
Workarounds
For users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one potential workaround.
You may disable redirects by setting allow_redirects to False on all calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you're currently relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination.
import requests r = requests.get('http://github.com/', allow_redirects=False)Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following individuals.
Dennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/)
Tobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@gmail.com)
Severity
References
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Requests Session object does not verify requests after making first request with verify=False
CVE-2024-35195 / GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56
More informationDetails
When using a requests.Session, if the first request to a given origin is made with verify=False, TLS certificate verification may remain disabled for all subsequent requests to that origin, even if verify=True is explicitly specified later.
This occurs because the underlying connection is reused from the session's connection pool, causing the initial TLS verification setting to persist for the lifetime of the pooled connection. As a result, applications may unintentionally send requests without certificate verification, leading to potential man-in-the-middle attacks and compromised confidentiality or integrity.
This behavior affects versions of requests prior to 2.32.0.
Severity
References
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Requests vulnerable to .netrc credentials leak via malicious URLs
CVE-2024-47081 / GHSA-9hjg-9r4m-mvj7
More informationDetails
Impact
Due to a URL parsing issue, Requests releases prior to 2.32.4 may leak .netrc credentials to third parties for specific maliciously-crafted URLs.
Workarounds
For older versions of Requests, use of the .netrc file can be disabled with trust_env=False on your Requests Session (docs).
References
https://github.com/psf/requests/pull/6965
https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Jun/2
Severity
References
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Requests has Insecure Temp File Reuse in its extract_zipped_paths() utility function
CVE-2026-25645 / GHSA-gc5v-m9x4-r6x2
More informationDetails
Impact
The requests.utils.extract_zipped_paths() utility function uses a predictable filename when extracting files from zip archives into the system temporary directory. If the target file already exists, it is reused without validation. A local attacker with write access to the temp directory could pre-create a malicious file that would be loaded in place of the legitimate one.
Affected usages
Standard usage of the Requests library is not affected by this vulnerability. Only applications that call extract_zipped_paths() directly are impacted.
Remediation
Upgrade to at least Requests 2.33.0, where the library now extracts files to a non-deterministic location.
If developers are unable to upgrade, they can set TMPDIR in their environment to a directory with restricted write access.
Severity
References
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
psf/requests (requests)v2.33.0
Compare Source
Announcements
uses Requests, please take a look at #7271. Give it a try, and report
any gaps or feedback you may have in the issue. 📣
Security
contents to a non-deterministic location to prevent malicious file
replacement. This does not affect default usage of Requests, only
applications calling the utility function directly.
Improvements
Bugfixes
malformed authentication to be applied to Requests on
Python 3.11+. (#7205)
Deprecations
Documentation
v2.32.5
Compare Source
Bugfixes
a new class of issues in Requests that have had negative impact across a number
of use cases. The Requests team has decided to revert this feature as long term
maintenance of it is proving to be unsustainable in its current iteration.
Deprecations
v2.32.4
Compare Source
Security
environment will retrieve credentials for the wrong hostname/machine from a
netrc file.
Improvements
Deprecations
v2.32.3
Compare Source
Bugfixes
HTTPAdapter. (#6716)
without the ssl module. (#6724)
v2.32.2
Compare Source
Deprecations
To provide a more stable migration for custom HTTPAdapters impacted
by the CVE changes in 2.32.0, we've renamed _get_connection to
a new public API, get_connection_with_tls_context. Existing custom
HTTPAdapters will need to migrate their code to use this new API.
get_connection is considered deprecated in all versions of Requests>=2.32.0.
A minimal (2-line) example has been provided in the linked PR to ease
migration, but we strongly urge users to evaluate if their custom adapter
is subject to the same issue described in CVE-2024-35195. (#6710)
v2.32.1
Compare Source
Bugfixes
v2.32.0
Compare Source
Security
Session will cause subsequent requests to the same origin to also ignore
cert verification, regardless of the value of verify.
(GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56)
Improvements
request time variance between first and subsequent requests. It should
also minimize certificate load time on Windows systems when using a Python
version built with OpenSSL 3.x. (#6667)
(chardet or charset_normalizer) when repackaged or vendored.
This enables pip and other projects to minimize their vendoring
surface area. The Response.text() and apparent_encoding APIs
will default to utf-8 if neither library is present. (#6702)
Bugfixes
calculated in the request content-length. (#6589)
urllib3 to unnecessarily reparse the request URI. (#6644)
Deprecations
Documentation
Packaging
The source files for the projects (formerly requests) is now located
in src/requests in the Requests sdist. (#6506)
using hatchling. This should not impact the average user, but extremely old
versions of packaging utilities may have issues with the new packaging format.
Configuration
📅 Schedule: (UTC)
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.