A sophisticated proof-of-concept demonstrating advanced in-memory evasion techniques that cyclically encrypts and decrypts shellcode while fluctuating between different memory protection states to evade detection by memory scanners.

• Overview
• Features
• How It Works
  • RW Fluctuation Mode
  • PAGE_NOACCESS Mode
• Quick Start
  • Prerequisites
  • Building
  • Usage
• Detection Analysis
  • Moneta Scanner Results
  • PE-Sieve Analysis
• Technical Deep Dive
  • Memory Protection Mechanics
  • Hook Implementation
  • Encryption Strategy
• Educational Background
• References

Shellcode Fluctuation is an advanced cybersecurity tool that demonstrates modern malware and sophisticated memory evasion techniques. This tool implements the following new approach to hide shellcode in memory:

• Dynamic Encryption: XOR32-based encryption/decryption of shellcode contents
• Memory Protection Cycling: Alternating between RW/NoAccess and RX memory states
• Sleep Hook Interception: Leveraging kernel32!Sleep calls for timing control
• Scanner Evasion: Bypassing tools like Moneta and pe-sieve

When shellcode resides in RW or NoAccess memory pages, advanced memory scanners cannot detect or dump it for analysis:

• Multi-Mode Operation: Support for RW and PAGE_NOACCESS fluctuation modes
• Self-Aware Shellcode: Automatic detection and management of shellcode boundaries
• Hook Management: Intelligent hooking/unhooking to minimize IOCs
• Memory Scanner Bypass: Evades Moneta, PE-Sieve, and similar tools
• IOC Minimization: Reduces detectable indicators of compromise
• Dynamic Protection: Real-time memory protection state changes
• Encryption Cycling: Continuous encryption/decryption during sleep cycles

The technique operates by intercepting the moment when shellcode enters a sleep state and performing cryptographic operations combined with memory protection changes.

graph TD
    A[Shellcode Execution] --> B[Sleep Call Detected]
    B --> C[Hook kernel32!Sleep]
    C --> D[Encrypt Shellcode XOR32]
    D --> E[Change Protection to RW]
    E --> F[Unhook Sleep - Clean IOCs]
    F --> G[Execute Original Sleep]
    G --> H[Re-hook Sleep]
    H --> I[Decrypt Shellcode]
    I --> J[Restore RX Protection]
    J --> A

Detailed Process:

1. Initialization: Hook kernel32!Sleep with custom callback
2. Injection: Deploy shellcode via VirtualAlloc → memcpy → CreateThread
3. Sleep Interception: Custom MySleep callback triggers on sleep
4. Encryption Phase: XOR32 encrypt shellcode + flip to PAGE_READWRITE
5. IOC Cleanup: Temporarily unhook Sleep to avoid detection
6. Sleep Execution: Call original ::Sleep function
7. Decryption Phase: Restore shellcode + flip back to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
8. Re-hook: Reinstall Sleep hook for next cycle

This advanced mode, inspired by ORCA666's research, uses Vectored Exception Handling (VEH):

graph TD
    A[Shellcode Execution] --> B[Sleep Call Detected]
    B --> C[Encrypt + Set PAGE_NOACCESS]
    C --> D[Execute Sleep]
    D --> E[Shellcode Resume Attempt]
    E --> F[Access Violation Exception]
    F --> G[VEH Handler Triggered]
    G --> H[Decrypt + Restore RX]
    H --> I[Continue Execution]
    I --> A

Key Advantages:

• Complete Invisibility: Shellcode appears as inaccessible memory
• Exception-Driven: Automatic restoration on access attempts
• Enhanced Security: Even more difficult to detect than RW mode

• OS: Windows 10/11
• Compiler: Visual Studio 2022
• Target: Cobalt Strike Beacon or compatible shellcode

• Download the project to your computer.

• Open the solution file (ShellcodeFluctuation.sln).

• Select Build Solution from the Build menu.

ShellcodeFluctuation.exe shellcode_file fluctuation_mode

Fluctuation Modes:

• -1 - Analysis Mode: Load but don't inject (IOC baseline testing)
• 0 - Standard Mode: Inject without fluctuation (detection comparison)
• 1 - RW Mode: Fluctuate between RW and RX protection
• 2 - NoAccess Mode: Fluctuate between NoAccess and RX protection

Example Usage:

# Test baseline IOCs without injection
ShellcodeFluctuation.exe beacon64.bin -1

# Standard injection (detectable)
ShellcodeFluctuation.exe beacon64.bin 0

# RW fluctuation mode (evasive)
ShellcodeFluctuation.exe beacon64.bin 1

# PAGE_NOACCESS mode (maximum evasion)
ShellcodeFluctuation.exe beacon64.bin 2

[DETECTED] Abnormal private executable memory
Region: 0x000002210C091000 - 0x000002210C0C0000
Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
Type: MEM_PRIVATE

[CLEAN] No abnormal executable memory detected
[INFO] Modified code in kernel32.dll (expected IOC)

PE-Sieve detection requires the /data 3 parameter to identify implanted PE modules. The tool successfully evades standard scanning modes but may trigger on advanced analysis due to kernel32 modifications.

Detection Matrix:

The core technique leverages Windows memory management APIs to create a dynamic protection scheme:

// Encryption + Protection Change
VirtualProtect(shellcodeAddr, size, PAGE_READWRITE, &oldProtect);
xor32(shellcodeBuffer, size, encryptionKey);

// For NoAccess mode
VirtualProtect(shellcodeAddr, size, PAGE_NOACCESS, &oldProtect);

The hooking mechanism uses a fast trampoline technique:

// x64 Trampoline
uint8_t trampoline[] = {
    0x49, 0xBA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // mov r10, addr
    0x41, 0xFF, 0xE2                                            // jmp r10
};

XOR32 Implementation:

• Key Generation: Cryptographically secure random 32-bit keys
• Performance: Optimized 32-bit operations with byte-level fallback
• Coverage: Complete shellcode region encryption

Important: Avoid unhooking kernel32.dll during operation as this will prevent the fluctuation mechanism from functioning. If using tools like unhook-bof, exclude kernel32:

beacon> unhook kernel32
[*] Will skip these modules: kernel32.dll

This technique builds upon foundational research in memory evasion:

• Gargoyle by Josh Lospinoso - Original memory protection cycling concept
• ORCA666's 0x41 - PAGE_NOACCESS
• ThreadStackSpoofer - Complementary thread-level evasion

1. Gargoyle: Memory Scanning Evasion
2. Masking Malicious Memory Artifacts by Forrest Orr

• Masking Malicious Memory Artifacts - Part I
• Masking Malicious Memory Artifacts - Part II
• Masking Malicious Memory Artifacts - Part III
• Hook Heaps and Live Free

• Moneta - Memory scanner for detecting malicious artifacts
• PE-Sieve - Scans for inline hooks and other modifications
• BeaconEye - Beacon configuration extractor
• ThreadStackSpoofer - Thread call stack spoofing

This project is licensed under the MIT License. For more information, see the LICENSE file.