```json
{
  "title": "Close SSRF gaps in all api_url configs and block metadata IP encodings",
  "body": "## Summary\n\nConsolidate `api_url` SSRF validation into a single shared helper and apply it to all six SDK configs that accept an `api_url` field — previously only the storage and client configs validated the URL while the three provider configs and `EntitiesClientConfig` accepted any string.\n\n## Changes\n\n- Add `atomicmemory/core/url.py` with a single `validate_api_url` helper that centralizes scheme/host checks and SSRF defense.\n- Wire the shared validator into all six configs: `AtomicMemoryClientConfig`, `StorageClientConfig`, `EntitiesClientConfig`, `AtomicMemoryProviderConfig`, `HindsightProviderConfig`, and `Mem0ProviderConfig`.\n- Switch to posture B (match Node SDK): loopback/private/reserved IP literals are **allowed by default** (the SDK routinely connects to local and self-hosted cores); link-local and cloud-metadata addresses (`169.254.169.254`, `fe80::/10`) are always blocked.\n- Canonicalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (`::ffff:169.254.169.254` → `169.254.169.254`) so the metadata block is deterministic across Python 3.10/3.11.\n- Canonicalize legacy IPv4 encodings (decimal `2852039166`, hex `0xA9FEA9FE`, dotted-octal `0251.0376.0251.0376`) via `socket.inet_aton` so they cannot bypass the link-local block.\n- Add `allowPrivateNetworks` field (default `True`) on every config; setting it to `False` also rejects loopback/private/reserved literals.\n- Add `tests/core/test_url.py` — 12 parametrized cases covering allowed, always-blocked, strict-mode, IPv4-mapped IPv6, whitespace stripping, and encoded-address bypass scenarios.\n- Add `tests/providers/test_config_ssrf.py` — integration coverage for each config surface plus a **reflective enumeration test** (`test_every_api_url_config_blocks_imds`) that auto-discovers every `BaseModel` subclass with an `api_url` field and fails if any future config omits the guard.\n- Bump package version to 1.1.2.\n\n## Why\n\nThe three provider configs and `EntitiesClientConfig` had no URL validation at all, so a crafted `apiUrl` could reach the AWS IMDS endpoint (`169.254.169.254`) or its non-canonical encodings (decimal, hex, octal, IPv4-mapped IPv6). The validator was also applied per-surface with duplicated logic, so adding a new config would silently inherit no protection. The shared helper closes both gaps at one chokepoint.\n\n## Validation\n\n- `uv run pytest tests/core/test_url.py tests/providers/test_config_ssrf.py` — all new tests pass.\n- The reflective enumeration test asserts ≥ 6 configs are discovered and each rejects the IMDS literal; it will fail automatically if a future config with an `api_url` field omits the validator.\n- `uv run mypy atomicmemory --strict` and `uv run ruff check .` both pass clean."
}
```