fix(reconcile): repair a CA:TRUE certificate, which a pin check cannot see - #19
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ralyodio merged 1 commit intoAug 9, 2026
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fix(reconcile): repair a CA:TRUE certificate, which a pin check cannot see#19ralyodio merged 1 commit into
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…t see Reconcile re-runs setup-origin.sh when a name's nginx block is missing or the served key is not the published one. Neither fires for the case that left every stock client refusing these names: a certificate marked CA:TRUE. It is the right key -- the pin matches exactly -- and it is unusable. An anchor marked CA:TRUE may issue for any name rather than the one printed on it, so nothing can safely trust it directly, and a stock client is left with "self-signed certificate" and no way forward. The repair reuses the key, so the pin does not move. That is what makes it free of any registry change, and it is precisely why the existing checks stay silent about it: serving and published agree. Without this trigger a box pulls the fix and then reconciles contentedly forever without ever applying it -- the fix ships and nothing happens, which is the worst of both. Converges in one pass rather than reloading nginx forever: after the repair the certificate is CA:FALSE and the pin is unchanged, so the next pass finds nothing to do. Also parameterises the origin probe address (MOSHPIT_ORIGIN_ADDR, still 127.0.0.1:443) so the certificate checks can be exercised against a fixture server rather than needing port 443 and root. Verified against the live origin: chovy.hacker serves CA:TRUE today, so the trigger fires on the next pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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vu1nz Security Review0 finding(s) in PR #? No security issues found. |
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Follow-up to #18. Without this, #18 ships and nothing happens.
The gap
moshpit-reconcile.sh re-runs setup-origin.sh when a name's nginx block is missing or the served key is not the published one. Neither fires for the case that left every stock client refusing these names: a certificate marked CA:TRUE.
It is the right key — the pin matches exactly — and it is unusable. An anchor marked CA:TRUE may issue for any name rather than the one printed on it, so nothing can safely trust it directly. A stock client gets self-signed certificate and has no way forward.
And the repair reuses the key, so the pin does not move. That is what makes it free of any registry change, and it is precisely why the existing checks stay silent about it: serving and published agree. So a box pulls #18 and then reconciles "already served" forever without applying it — the fix ships and the symptom never changes.
Verified on the live origin: chovy.hacker serves CA:TRUE today, and reconcile reports it as already served.
The fix
A third trigger, checked last because it is the expensive one and anything failing an earlier check is being re-issued anyway:
It converges in one pass. After the repair the certificate is CA:FALSE and the pin is unchanged, so the next pass finds nothing to do — no nginx reload once a minute forever, which is the failure the script's own header warns about. There is a test for that direction specifically.
Also parameterises the origin probe address (MOSHPIT_ORIGIN_ADDR, still defaulting to 127.0.0.1:443) so the certificate checks can run against a fixture server instead of needing port 443 and root.
Tests
5 new. The probe is lifted out of the script and run against real TLS servers rather than restated in the test — a restated pipeline would pass while the script probed something else. Two of them guard the ways this regresses silently: the helper being defined but never called, and the address being hardcoded back. Full suite 74/74.
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