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security(workflows): pin third-party Actions to a commit SHA by andife · Pull Request #5532 · tmux/tmux · GitHub

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security(workflows): pin third-party Actions to a commit SHA - #5532

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andife wants to merge 1 commit into
tmux:masterfrom
andife:security/pin-actions-to-sha
Open

security(workflows): pin third-party Actions to a commit SHA#5532
andife wants to merge 1 commit into
tmux:masterfrom
andife:security/pin-actions-to-sha

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andife commented Aug 25, 2026

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Summary

  • Pin dessant/lock-threads@v6, actions/checkout@v4, and actions/upload-artifact@v4 in .github/workflows/{lock,regress}.yml to their current tag's full commit SHA, keeping the tag as a trailing comment.
  • Tags are mutable — a compromised maintainer account (or a supply-chain attack on the action's own repo, as happened to tj-actions/changed-files in 2025) can retarget a tag your workflow already trusts, silently changing what code runs with that job's token.
  • lock.yml runs weekly with an issues: write, pull-requests: write, discussions: write token, so a hijacked lock-threads tag would have real reach even though the workflow never runs on untrusted PR code.

Test plan

  • Both modified files parse as valid YAML.
  • Diffed to confirm only the three uses: lines changed.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

dessant/lock-threads@v6, actions/checkout@v4, and
actions/upload-artifact@v4 were pinned to mutable tags rather than
commit SHAs. Anyone who compromises a maintainer's account (or the
maintainer themselves) can retarget a tag your workflows already
trust, silently swapping in different code with access to whatever
that job's token can do — lock.yml's runs with an
issues/pull-requests/discussions write token on every scheduled run.

Pin all three to their current tag's commit SHA, keeping the tag as
a trailing comment for readability.
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